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WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES©
By JOEL F. HANDLER*

Advanced countries that are experiencing high
unemployment are reconsidering their generous
welfare states in light of the American experience. This
article sets forth a summary of the principles of the U.S.
welfare reform -particularly
enforcing work
requirements by time-limited welfare-as well as the
assumptions, including, principally, that welfare
destroys work incentives and that jobs are available for
those who want to work. In fact, most welfare
recipients have extensive connections to the labour
market, but cannot survive on either jobs or welfare. If
the reforms are carried out as intended, severe
hardship will result. The predicted outcome is that
most states and localities will avoid draconian effects,
but there will continue to be a significant, largely
invisible increase in hardship. Low-wage labour market
reforms are proposed.

A la lumi~re de l'exprience Am6ricaine, les pays
industrialists connaissant un fort taux de ch6mage
remettent en cause la g6n6rosit6 de leurs politiques
sociales. Cet article resume les principes de la r6forme
d'assistance sociale des Etats Unis-partiuli~rement
l'assistance sociale temporaire pour combler les
exigences d'emploi-aussi bien que les mythes-dont le
fait que l'assistance sociale reduit les motivations au
travail et que l'emploi n'est disponible que pour ceux
qui d6sirent travailler. En fait, la plupart des
b6n6ficiaires d'assistance sociale poss dent les
ressources pour acceder au march6 du travail, mais ne
peuvent vivre d'un emploi ou de I'assistance sociale. Si
la r6forme est mise de l'avant telle que pr6vue, les
consequences pourraient Wtre n6fastes. Le cas 6ch6ant,
la plupart des ttats se soustrairont aux effets
draconiens de cette r6forme, sans toutefois 6tre en
mesure d'6viter lesdites cons6quences.
Cette
discussion propose une r6forme du march6 du travail
de gens a faible revenu.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States economic "miracle" is much in the news these
days: the creation of millions of jobs, unemployment below 5 per cent,
and no signs of inflation. In contrast, Canada and several Western
European countries are suffering from unprecedented high levels of
unemployment.1 Western European governments, because of the
budgetary constraints of the impending European currency treaty,
cannot expand welfare benefits to meet needs. In fact, somewhat
paradoxically, an attractive "solution" to many European policymakers is
to emulate the United States by cutting back significantly the welfare
state. Since the enactment of the new American welfare law in 1996, the
welfare caseloads have dropped by 1.4 million to a twenty-seven-year
low. 2
What is the connection between welfare reform and a growing
economy? True, so-called welfare reform-American style-cuts
benefits instead of spending money. But more significantly, from the
European perspective, is the idea that a generous welfare state is
inconsistent with the labour market flexibility needed for the new
economies of the twenty-first century. High unemployment, it is
believed, is caused by the high costs of labour, and workers are not
willing to take low-cost jobs, and that is the reason that these countries
are experiencing unprecedentedly high unemployment rates, increasing
inequality of incomes, increasing poverty, and increasing vulnerable
populations-for example, single parent families, unemployed youth,
and immigrants.
The proposed abandonment of the European and Canadian
welfare state is surely dismaying. These welfare states, with their
generosity and inclusiveness, represent collectively one of the crowning
achievements of the twentieth century. To follow the American lead is
not only dismaying, but also puzzling. The American statistics are
familiar. While millions of jobs have been created, they are, for the most
part, low-wage, contingent, part-time, and with low or no benefits. As a

1 Unemployment rates in mid-1997 were: Canada (9.1); France (12.6); Germany (11.4); Italy
(12.4); Spain (20.9); Sweden (8.8); Denmark (8.1); Netherlands (5.9); Britain (5.7). The Economist(2
August 1997) 80.
2 M. Healy, "50 States, 1 Rallying Cry: Get Off Aid and Get a Job" Los Angeles Times (21

August 1997) 1.
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consequence, the United States is experiencing unprecedented wage
inequality and persistent poverty, especially among vulnerable groups.3
In this article, I will describe briefly the nature of the most recent
so-called reform, why, if carried out as intended, it will produce great
harm, the implications for legal and community advocacy, and proposals
for new directions.
II. THE CURRENT WELFARE REFORM
Welfare reform was introduced during the 1992 presidential
campaign when Candidate Bill Clinton promised to "end welfare as we
know it." Welfare dependency, he said, had become a "way of life."
Clinton was referring to Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the welfare program primarily for single mothers and their
children. As a candidate, Clinton proposed a two-year time limit on
welfare during which the recipient would be required to participate in
training. At the end of two years, if the recipient had not been able to
secure a job, he or she would be offered a public job for a limited period
of time; in any event, welfare would end.
Over the next four years, welfare reform was the subject of
partisan politics. Finally, on the eve of the 1996 election, Clinton signed
The PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct of
19964 -a comprehensive bill that formally abolished AFDC, JOBS (the
work and training program for welfare recipients), and Emergency
Assistance to Families with Children. The Act replaced them with a
block grant of federal funds given to the states called Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).
The new legislation can be summarized in terms of four major
themes. The first is that it ends the "entitlement status" of welfare by
folding that program, along with several other programs, into block
grants to the states.S The amount of the grants are based on a formula.
3 See J.F. Handler & Y. Hasenfeld, We the Poor People: Work; Poverty, and Welfare Reform

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) c. 3 [hereinafter We The Poor].
4 Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.

5 Under the former law, AFDC is a grant-in-aid; thus, states were always free to refuse to have
an AEDC program-as long as they are willing to forgo Federal financial participation-roughly half

the costs. However, as a condition of participation, all eligible applicants for AFDC had to be
enrolled; the states and the federal government were obligated to appropriate the necessary funds.

Under the block grant proposal, states would be given a fixed amount of money by the federal
government. If the federal money was exhausted before the end of the fiscal year, a state could
either enroll new applicants with its own money, or deny aid until the next fiscal year, or, the states
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In return, the states are required to meet a basic maintenance of effort,
which is no less than 80 per cent of a "historic spending level." 6 Ending
"entitlement status" is supposed to send the message that recipients can
no longer count on welfare. The block grant provision would increase
state flexibility by allowing states more easily to reduce the amount of
money they spend on welfare or shift funds to other programs.
Presumably, states are free to determine which families receive
assistance, how much, and under what circumstances; if a state runs out
of funds, applicants can be placed on waiting lists or rejected. In other
words, there no longer is a guarantee of aid.
The second major theme combines time limits for welfare with
work requirements. There are two sets of time limits. First is the
two-year time limit. Starting in fiscal year (FY) 1997, a quarter of each
state's recipients must participate in "work activities;" the percentage of
the caseload increases annually to 50 per cent by i,' 2002. Up to 20 per
cent of the state's caseload can be exempted from this requirement. The
requirements are considerably higher for two-parent families. A state
risks a penalty for failure to meet the annual rate. 7 Second, recognizing
that many welfare recipients cycle on and off welfare, there is a
cumulative life-time five year limit on welfare.8
Third, time-limited welfare addresses the perceived lack of work
ethic on the part of welfare recipients. There are other parts of welfare
reform that speak to other issues. A cluster of provisions deals with
so-called "family values." Unless states specifically opt out, they cannot
provide aid to children who were conceived while the mother was on
welfare (called "the Family Cap"), or to minor parents unless they are
could go farther. For example, they could end AFDC as a cash program, and use the block grant
money for other programs (for example, child care, training) or for vouchers, and so forth. Under
these options, AFoc would no longer be an "entitlement;" poor single mothers and their children
would no longer have a guarantee of subsistence.
6 The federal formula is based on the higher of 1992-94 spending, 1994 spending, or 1995
spending for AFDCJOBS, and Emergency Assistance. For most states the TANF block grant amount
will be frozen through fiscal year 2002. A minority of states will receive an annual 2.5 per cent
adjustment. The maintenance of effort requirement is reduced to 75 per cent if a state meets the
work participation requirements. If the state does not meet the required spending level, it risks a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in the federal grant. See M. Greenberg & S. Savner, A Detailed
Summary of Key Provisionsof the TemporaryAssistance for Needy FamiliesBlock Grant of H.R. 3734
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Law and Social Policy, 1996) at 2.
7 The annual rate is based on the average monthly rates for the year. The hours per week
required to count as participation starts at twenty and increases to thirty by FY 2000. See Greenberg
& Savner, supra note 6 at 39.
8 There is a third work requirement: unless a state opts out, adults who are not exempt or
participating in work activities, must participate in community service after having received
assistance for two months; ibid. at 3.
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attending school (called "Learnfare") and living at home. Also, the
states must reduce or eliminate assistance if the family does not
cooperate in the establishment of paternity and obtaining child support.
States would also have the option to deny aid to mothers under the age
of eighteen.
Fourth, there are provisions to deny aid to immigrants, both
legal and illegal. For example, future legal immigrants who have not
become citizens would be ineligible for most federal welfare benefits
during the first five years in the United States. Supplemental Security
Income (ssi) and food stamps would end for noncitizens now receiving
benefits. There are other provisions that will also impact on poor
families. For example, thousands of children will lose ssi disability
benefits under stricter standards. Unless a state opts out, people
convicted of drug felonies cannot receive assistance.
In the meantime, while welfare reform has been debated in
Washington, the states have been reforming welfare on their own under
waivers granted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Almost forty states have either received waivers, or are in the process of
applying for waivers which can continue under the new law. Waiver
provisions vary, and not all of them are punitive, but the most popular
deal with time-limits (usually two years, although some states are opting
for shorter periods), increased work requirements, and family values.
Several states, for example, along with strict time limits, are mandating
quick entry into the low-wage labour market or, in the alternative,
requiring recipients to "work off' the welfare grant at community service
jobs. Other states have Family Cap provisions. Counting the number
and variety of state waivers, it is clear that the country was already in a
full-blown welfare reform.
III. THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE CURRENT
WELFARE REFORM
Conservatives became increasingly concerned over the perceived
connection between welfare and the lack of work ethic in the Reagan
years. It was during that period that Charles Murray popularized the
idea that welfare induced people to quit work and to break up homes. 9
As part of the more general campaign against liberalism and the Great
Society of the 1960s, the idea of entitlement to welfare was portrayed as
9 C. Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books,

1984).
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a corrupting influence on recipients. Citizens have responsibilities, not
entitlements, the Republicans said. The "truly needy" deserve to be
helped, but they must also contribute to society by supporting
themselves and their families if they could.10 The theme of responsibility
became very popular, and is now endorsed by liberals as well. In fact,
time-limited welfare was first proposed by the liberal Left.// Dependent
mothers will be helped-by income and by education and training-but
after a reasonable period of time, they must help themselves.
Behind the "new" assumptions there are several long-standing,
continuing assumptions as to what is wrong with welfare and what to do
about welfare.
First, "dependency," as used in the welfare context, is not simply
being poor. It is not simply being out of work. Rather, welfare
dependency is a problem of attitude; specifically, a moral failure to have
the proper work ethic. It is a way of life.
Second, the assignment of moral fault is rarely unidimensional.
When those with whom we are familiar, who are "like us," fall on hard
times, it is because of "bad luck" or "misfortune." Moral condemnation
is reserved for those who are not only poor, but who are different-in
terms of race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion or who violate
patriarchal norms. The poverty of our neighbourly, aged, white widow is
different from the dependency of the inner-city young black mother or
single male, and, increasingly, immigrants. Race and ethnicity have
always been fault lines in American history. Although the current
welfare reform emphasizes work, it is essential to keep in mind the
multiple dimensions of the moral condemnation of welfare recipients.
The third assumption is that providing aid destroys not only the
work ethic but other family values as well. Because of the multiple
aspects of moral fault, welfare policy is concerned with "reformation"
rather than redistribution.
Fourth, welfare reforms (reformation) are directed at changing
individual behavior rather than the environment. Self-sufficiency
through work is to be achieved by changing the mothers rather than
labor markets or other institutional arrangements that contribute
towards successful, independent lives. Since "decent" people can find
work, it is assumed that people who want to work can find it. Focusing
10 Probably the most noteworthy statement is L. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social
Obligationsof Citizenship (New York: Free Press, 1988).
11 1.Garfinkel & S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their Children:A New Ameican Dilemnma
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1986); and D. Ellwood, Poor Support: Poverty in the
American Family (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
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on the individual relieves policymakers from confronting the more
difficult issues of labor markets, redistribution, or other institutional
change. It allows policymakers to isolate the recipient, to blame the
victim. It is the politics of exclusion.
Fifth, the reforms are directed at the adult welfare recipients,
who, in this case, are almost exclusively women. Despite the obvious
importance of men to family support and the socialization of children,
men are virtually ignored, except for child support. Despite the origins
of AFDC--concern for poor children-and despite the seemingly strong
concern for the transmission of deviant values, with relatively few
exceptions (for example, requiring school attendance), welfare children
are also largely ignored, except when teens become pregnant. From its
earliest days, AFDC (then ADc) has been concerned with regulating the
mothers. It is easier, of course, to ascribe moral fault and justify
punishment for adults and teenagers than it is for infants and toddlers.
The current welfare reforms are being hailed as "new," that now
welfare will be really changed. This sort of political rhetoric, of course,
accompanies most legislative changes. In fact, both the underlying
assumptions about welfare reform and the remedies seem to be timeless.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE WELFARE REFORMS
Predictions as to the likely effects of major social legislation are
always uncertain. Much depends on the state of the economy and the
political climate. First, I will discuss the likely effects if the law is carried
out as presently written, both nationally and in California, which is often
a bell-wether for the country. Then, I will offer some predictions, based
on past experience.
According to an Urban Institute study, AFDC spending would be
reduced by $5.3 billion, with nearly one million families losing all
benefits.12 ssi spending is reduced by nearly $5 billion (20 per cent) with
almost 900,000 people receiving less benefits. About 850,000 families
lose food stamps. With all of the cuts, one in ten families will have
reductions in total income, averaging $1,300 per year. About 2.6 million
more persons will fall below the poverty line. This includes about 1.1
million children, an increase of 12 per cent. The poverty gap would
increase by about $6 billion for all families. Almost half of these families
are already in the labour force. According to the Urban Institute,
12 S. Zedlowski et aL, PotentialEffects of CongressionalWelfare Reform Legislation on Family

Incomes (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1996) Table 2.
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moving welfare families into the -paid labour force would not
dramatically affect these results, since most welfare recipients who do
find work still remain poor.
What would be the impact on California? The state will lose
$11.4 billion over five years-$2.8 billion from AFDC, $6.9 billion from
the various immigrant provisions; $1.4 billion from food stamps; and
$230 million from child and ssi provisions.13
The idea, of course, is that those subject to the cut-offs will find
jobs. How realistic is this assumption? California must move nearly 1
million people off of welfare over the next few years. However, state
unemployment is around 7 per cent-with most of the 1 million people
currently looking for work not on welfare. An additional 1 million not
counted as "unemployed" want to work, and nearly one-half million
part-time workers would like to work more hours.
If the state continues to rebound, an average of 300,000 jobs will
be created annually. But those on welfare have significant employment
deficits-about two-thirds of AFDC adults cannot pass a basic literacy
test, half lack a high school diploma, more than 40 per cent are clinically
depressed. Then, there are the problems of substance abuse, disabled
children and disabled relatives to care for. What do employers want?
People with social skills, with employment histories, and not people with
potential problems---"attitudes," women with young children, etc.
In short, the employment prospects for these women are bleak.
Even in the most successful program, Riverside, California, at the end of
three years, two-thirds of the experimentals were not working, and half
of the recipients never worked during the entire demonstration project.
The experimentals earned only about twenty dollars more per week than
the controls, most continued to receive welfare, and practically all
remained poor.14
In light of the previous discussion about the state of the
low-wage labour market, especially in California, but also pretty much
true throughout the country, a significant number of welfare recipients
will not be able to permanently leave welfare via work. However, how
many will actually be cut-off-whether under the two-year or the
five-year rule depends, in part, on the size of the rolls. For a long time,
AFDC rolls were growing. Now, as the economy continues to improve,
rolls are declining. They are declining in California as well, although at
13 J.F. Handler, "Welfare Reform: The Impact on California," in X. Kayden, ed., California
Policy Options 1997 (Los Angeles: UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research, 1997) 117 at
128.
14

Supra note 3, c. 4.
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a slower rate-four per cent versus nine per cent on average. Whether
rolls continue to decline or stabilize or increase depends ultimately on
the economy.
Assuming that by 2002 there is no net growth in the California
AFDC rolls, then of the 1.6 million children, approximately 36 per cent
will be long-term recipients. Therefore, AFDC will be terminated for
575,000 children. If the economy slackens, and present AFDC growth
resumes, then, in 2005, AF'C will be terminated for 994,000 children.
Again, assuming present growth rates, under the paternity
establishment requirements, 588,000 children will lose benefits; under
the denial of additional children born to current AFDC recipients, 433,000
children will be denied benefits. In addition, 13,770 children born to
unmarried mothers will be denied benefits until the mother turns 18.
The combined effects of the AFDC cut-offs will affect 1,158,000 children.
Under the ssi provisions, 14,500 disabled children in California will
either lose benefits or be ineligible.15
What will happen to these children? Since the majority of
welfare recipients are short-term and leave when they obtain work, we
can assume that most of the long-termers will have the most difficulty in
finding and keeping a job.16 Day care will be a significant problem.
California already has a waiting list of 225,000 poor children for
subsidized day care. Low-income working mothers have waited as long
as two years to receive a subsidy for a toddler, and as long as one year
for an infant. Not surprisingly, costs influence the quality of day care,
and recent studies have shown that there is an extensive amount of poor
to mediocre day care, and that children in poor to mediocre full-time
day care-especially infants-are increasingly at risk developmentally
and physically. 17 Whether working or not, poverty will increase for this
group; poverty is the single most important predictor of poor outcomes
for children-abuse and neglect, poor health, school failure, teen
pregnancy, crime, and delinquency.I8
15

Supra note 13.

16 Contrary to the popular stereotype, about two-thirds of welfare recipients are connected to
the labour force-they are either combining work with welfare or have recently worked-and they
leave welfare, mostly via work, within two to four years. However, many return to welfare because
jobs end or there is a family crisis. Nevertheless, they still leave welfare permanently in a relatively
short time. See supra note 13, c. 3.
17 See W. T. Gormley Jr., Everybody's Children:Child Care as a PublicProblem (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).
18 S. McLanahan & G. Sandefur, Growing Up With a Single Parent (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994).
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One of the most serious problems-virtually, a time-bomb ready
to explode-is the potential impact of the cut-offs on the foster care
system. The existing state foster care system is in crisis. It is overloaded
and underfunded. For example, at the present time, there are
approximately 60,000 children in the Los Angeles child welfare system
which is about 20 per cent more children than it was designed to
accommodate. When AFDC was cut by 6 per cent in 1992, there was a 20
per cent increase in the number of child abuse cases reported, and a 10
per cent increase in the number of children who entered the child
welfare system. If only a fraction of the children subject to the welfare
cuts enter the foster care system, the costs will skyrocket. Assuming no
change in AFDC rolls, then if half of the children who lose AFDC benefits
need foster care, the cost to the state would be $80 million additional
funds per month. If only 10 per cent need foster care, the cost would be
$16 million per month. If five per cent of these children are older, and
have to go to group homes, then the cost would be $81 million
additionally each month. The Los Angeles County director of childrens'
services was quoted as saying that if only one out of twenty of these
children ended up in the child protection service, the cost-for Los
Angeles County-would increase by $185 million. If no additional funds
were available, every child protection worker would have to be laid off.19
And the consequences for children in foster care are not good.
Foster care children have higher rates of both acute and chronic medical
and mental health problems, higher rates of growth problems, and three
times the national average for asthma. In one study in California, nearly
80 per cent of foster care children had emotional, developmental, or
behavioural problems. Infants and toddlers were more likely to manifest
developmental problems (motor, language, cognitive, and self-help
concerns). Various studies have found that up to 60 per cent of foster
children suffer from moderate to severe mental health problems, and
that 40 per cent have physical health problems. In California, foster
children are almost ten times more likely to use mental health services
and are likely to be hospitalized almost twice as long as other poor
children. While foster children make up only about 4 per cent of

19 J.F. Handler, "Welfare Reform 1995-1996: The Time-Bomb Ready to Explode on
California's Children" (Los Angeles: Southern California Inter-University Consortium on
Homelessness and Poverty, 1996); and J. Wolch & H. Sommer, "Los Angeles in an Era of Welfare
Reform: Implications for Poor People and Community Well-being" (Los Angeles: Southern
California Inter-University Consortium on Homelessness and Poverty, 1997).
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California's children, they account for 40 per cent of Medi-Cal mental
health expenditures 2 0
With the increase in poverty, greater numbers of children are
entering the foster care system as a consequence of neglect. There is a
greater prevalence of drug abuse among the parents and health
problems among the children. In California, between 1984 and 1993, the
number of children in foster care increased from 37,306 to over 85,000.
The children are younger.
Forty-one per cent are
African-American-an increase of 241 per cent. The most common
reason for placement has changed from physical and sexual abuse to
neglect and abandonment, and the time in placement has increased by
25 per cent. Increasing numbers of infants are entering the system, but
remaining in care longer, thus decreasing their chances for adoption and
increasing their chances for multiple placements. Health and mental
health problems increase with multiple placements. Adolescents who
have been in foster care are at high risk of educational failure,
unemployment, emotional disturbance, and other negative outcomes.
Although many of these adolescents were at risk before they entered the
system, the system is unable to meet their needs or prepare them
adequately for adult life. In short, the new welfare reforms will certainly
increase the poverty and hardship for hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of California's children. Already these children are at high risk
of failing to become successful, productive adults. The odds will now be
increased 2 1
The likelihood of significant impacts on the child protection
system is not far-fetched when one considers how close to the edge many
AFDC families are living.
One only has to look at the changing
composition of the homeless population. Today, nationwide, more than
a third of the homeless are families, an increase of 10 per cent since
1985. Most of these families are headed by women. In addition to
poverty and limited employment opportunities, these mothers often
have suffered from personal traumas. In a recent study of homeless
families in Massachusetts, 91.6 per cent of the homeless and 81.8 per
cent of the housed mothers reported physical or sexual abuse at some
point in their lives. Using conservative measures (for example, excluding
spanking, shoving, slaps), almost two-thirds of both groups reported
violence by parents or caretakers. More than 40 per cent were sexually
20 M. Courtney, "The Foster Care Crisis," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper,
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1996); and N. Halfon, "Health Status of Children in Foster
Care" (April 1995) 149 Archives of PediatricsandAdolescentMedicine 386.

21 Halfon, supra note 20.
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molested, 63 per cent reported assaults by intimate male partners
(included being punched, kicked, burned, choked, beaten, threatened, or
attacked with a knife or a gun, but excluded pushed, shoved, or slapped
fewer than six times), and 25 per cent reported physical or sexual attacks
by nonintimates. AFDC provided at least some financial stability; families
not on AFDC were far more likely to end up homeless than AFDC
families. 22
Who will bear these costs? The families, themselves, of course,
but also government. We have not come to the point where mothers and
children are turned out of shelters and left to beg and die in the streets.
Shelters, foster families, and group homes have to be paid. These are
primarily local government costs. Just as the federal government is
getting rid of the "welfare problem" by delegating it to the states, so too
will state governments delegate the problem to the counties and
municipalities. Delegation is a favourite technique of managing conflict
in American politics.
V. THE FUTURE?
If the past is any guide, dramatic changes will probably not occur
in welfare. Throughout history, welfare policy has always been largely
symbolic.2 3 Myths and stereotypes gain prominence; drastic reforms are
enacted; but actual policy is usually decoupled from administration.
There are many reasons, but usually the policies, as enacted, are too
draconian and, more importantly, too costly in the end. In the late 19th
century, outdoor relief was never really abolished; in the late 20th
century, a long series of work reforms has never been implemented.
Serious welfare-to-work programs-including community-service
jobs-are more expensive than welfare, and so is shelter care and foster
care. 24
AFDC

Under the present reforms, there is plenty of room to fudge.
rolls are declining, which relieves a lot of pressure; under the

22 E. Bassuk, A. Browne & J. Buckner, "Single Mothers and Welfare" Scientific American

(October 1996) 60.
23
J.F. Handler & Y. Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty: Welfare Refonn in America
(Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991).
24 For example, Wisconsin has launched one of the most ambitious and well-funded
welfare-to-work programs. Supporting a family on welfare costs about $9,700; supporting a welfare
family transitioning to work (training, child care, health care, post-employment support, etc.) costs
about $15,700: J. DeParle, "Getting Opal Caples to Work," New York Times Magazine (24 August
1997) 32.
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block-grant formulas (based on historic caseloads), states have extra
money and the number of recipients that states have to place in work
programs is reduced. The states can decide what constitutes work or
"best effort," and can excuse up to 20 per cent of the caseload.
Furthermore, even if states do not meet their quotas, federal penalties
are not likely. States were rarely, if ever, sanctioned for not meeting
quality control requirements. There are always excuses, and state
congressional delegations, to press for relief from federal penalties.
Similar considerations may well apply within states. Counties and
municipalities will resist state-imposed welfare costs. The usual practice
in the face of these conflicting pressures is myth and ceremony. Some
recipients will find jobs and leave welfare-whether as a result of the
programs is another matter, some will be sanctioned and everyone will
proclaim success. Politicians, including the president, are already
claiming success because of the sharp decline in welfare rolls, even
though the law has barely been implemented.
However, while I do not think that dramatic changes will occur,
the subtle, low-visibility changes that have been happening over the past
two decades will continue, if not increase, and this is very serious. Here,
I am referring to the continued, gradual erosion of benefits, either by
failing to raise grants or actually imposing percentage cuts in benefits.
Other changes are also going on. States can always reduce rolls on the
basis of fraud, especially for off-the-books income. Most .welfare
families supplement their income by off-the-books earnings or by gifts
from relatives and friends, including some child support.2S This vital, but
extra, income, is not reported; hence, all these families are vulnerable to
sanctions. And sanctions reduce welfare costs.
Even though
poverty-related costs may show up elsewhere in another part of the
county budget, that occurs at a different time and a different place.
This low-visibility sanctioning can become increasingly serious if
states are successful in privatizing their welfare systems. In Texas, for
example, large corporations such as Lockheed and IBM are bidding to
privatize the entire welfare system. At the present time, small parts of
welfare-work demonstration projects, for example-are sometimes
privatized, but here we are talking about intake, verification, monitoring,
and sanctioning. This is a really serious development. The history of
privatization, which is very extensive in the United States, shows that
very quickly private contractors become sole-source bidders and
25 C. Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992); and K.M. Harris, "Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in Poverty"
(1993) 99 Am. J. Soc. 317.
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governments, in effect, become trapped in a monopoly situation. The
state governments and their contractors will be under pressure to show a
positive cost-benefit ratio. With privatization of services, major cost
reductions come through reducing labour costs. 26 Then, it is easy to save
money in welfare by denying entry, imposing sanctions, and terminating
benefits. Finally, it will be very difficult to find out what is going on-to
get the data from the private companies, and, increasingly, from public
agencies.
This kind of welfare reform-what Michael Lipsky called
"bureaucratic disentitlement" 27 -is particularly insidious because
increasingly, the victims have no redress. They no longer have the
means to challenge field-level agency decisions. I am not thinking
primarily of the end of the formal entitlement status; although not
helpful, governments do have to act lawfully. Rather, the poor no longer
have legal help. Although technically available, the Legal Services
Corporation was never able to handle the need, and now it is badly
crippled. In addition to welfare reforms, the Republican Congress
-unable to eliminate Legal Services entirely-limited its ability to
challenge welfare reform. 28
As stated, welfare rolls are finally declining as the economy
continues to improve. Hopefully, as Americans begin to feel better
about their personal lives, and, as a result of the new legislation, the
welfare crisis will begin to recede in the political conscious. Perhaps,
then, some of the unfortunate consequences of present policies can be
ameliorated.
VI. NEW DIRECTIONS
What direction should we take for welfare reform? Contrary to
the stereotype, most welfare recipients are working, or have recently
worked, and will leave welfare in a relatively short time via work. They
may return to work, when jobs disappear or there is a family crisis, but,
even so most will eventually leave via work. In other words, and this is
26 See J.D. Donahue, The PrivatizationDecision:Public Ends, PrivateMeans (New York: Basic
Books, 1989); and J.F. Handler, Down From Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and

Empowerment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) c. 4.
27
M. Lipsky, "Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs" (1984) 58 Soc. Serv.
Rev. 3.

28 For example, Legal Services, a publicly funded federal legal-aid system for non-criminal
matters, can no longer handle class action lawsuits. The ban applies not only to federal funds, but
funds that particular offices receive from any other source.
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the crucial point, most welfare recipients are indistinguishable from the
low-wage workers-the working poor. For a variety of reasons, they do
not qualify for Unemployment Insurance, and therefore use welfare. 29
The way to "reform" welfare then is to reform the low-wage labour
market: to make more work available, to increase the earnings from
employment, to provide post-employment back-up support for
breakdowns in child care, transportation, and so forth, to provide
subsidies for child care, and to insure health care.30
There are a number of advantages to this approach. First, in
contrast to welfare, poverty is a major issue and poverty will be reduced.
Moreover, poverty will be reduced by attachment to the paid labour
force, which reinforces the work ethic. Second, welfare rolls will be
reduced. With a reformed labour market, fewer women will have to rely
on welfare in the first place, cycling on and off welfare will be reduced,
and exits via work will increase. Third, reforming the low-wage labour
market applies to all the working poor. Welfare mothers are
reconceptualized as part of the working poor-where they belong.
Significantly, men are included, and they have to be part of the
anti-poverty program. Fourth, there will be adults who cannot succeed
in the labour market, but these numbers will be much smaller than the
total number of adult recipients (as well as the present number of unand under-employed). It is hoped that this may reduce the "crisis"
politics of welfare, although this may be wishful thinking.
There has to be jobs. Current welfare policy always assumes that
jobs are available and that the "problem" lies with the welfare recipient,
but it is simply not true that there are enough jobs. National data are
not collected on the actual number of job vacancies but just on the
number of people actively seeking work. Even here, we lack good
estimates of those who are involuntarily un- or under-employed.
However, whenever detailed area studies have been made, they have
always shown that applicants outnumber considerably the availability of
jobs. Therefore, reforming the low-wage labour market has to include
job creation policy. There have been some successful job-creation
programs-cwA in the Depression, and CETA-but they arouse
opposition and are always short-lived. And today, there is very little talk
about disturbing the labour markets 31

29 D. Maranville, "Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment Insurance and the
Contingent Worklforce,"(1995) 4 B. U. Pub. Int. LJ. 291.
30 These proposals are discussed at length, in We The Poor,supra note 3, c. 5-6.
31 Ibid. c. 5.
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What kinds of jobs? Ideally, there should be an economy full of
well-paying jobs with benefits. But this is unlikely-at least in the near
term. The more likely scenario is a world of low-wage, contingent jobs
with few benefits. This means that additional income and benefits will
have to supplied. At long last, after considerable doubt and struggle, the
minimum wage has been raised modestly. So far, the dire predictions
have not come to pass, and it would seem that further, modest raises
should be considered. In addition, the Earned Income Credit (EIc) has
to be maintained and strengthened. The EIC is the contemporary version
of the "negative income tax." Low-income earners receive money back
from the Treasury. The more a person earns, the more he or she
receives up to a break-even point, when benefits start to decline until a
certain earned income level is reached. At the present time, the EIC is a
significant program. Nearly 14 million people receive the EIC, and the
benefits are substantial. For a family with two or more children, earning
$8,500 per year, the benefit will be $3,370, which is just about the federal
poverty line. More than 6 million working families below the poverty
line are eligible, and the incomes of 1 million workers will be raised
above the poverty line32
The Eic is expensive. By FY 1998, when fully phased in, it is
expected to cost $24.5 billion per year. Thus far, the EIC has remained
popular because it supports workers. However, it is not trouble-free. It
is claimed, although there is no clear evidence, that there is a
disincentive to work once the break-even point is reached and benefits
begin to decline. There are also problems of participation, errors,
exploitation by for-profit tax preparers, and fraud. Much can be done to
improve the program.3 3
Increasing the income from work will help two other major
issues: child care and health care. That is, with more income, families
will be able to afford better child care and health care. Nevertheless,
extensive subsidies will still be necessary. The costs of child care have
already been mentioned. What has to be emphasized are the serious
risks to the children and to all of society prevalent in the extensive world
of poor quality day care. Unless addressed, these risks will steadily

32 R.H. Haveman & J.K. Scholz, "Transfers, Taxes, and Welfare Reform" (1994) 47 Nat'l Tax
J. 417.
33 J.K. Scholz, "The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and Anti-Poverty
Effectiveness" (1994) 47 Nat'l Tax J. 31; and A.L Alstott, "The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform" (1995) 108 Harv. L Rev. 533.
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increase as more infants need child care and as more mothers are
required to work non-standard shifts 3 4
The problems of health care have been on the public agenda for
several years. Here, I just want to note the connection between poverty,
health, and employment. What is usually not considered, but is very
important, is the health status of children. Not only are poor children
more at risk but when children are sick, mothers cannot work. Yet,
more and more low-wage employers either cannot afford the cost of
health insurance, are either dropping coverage altogether, or are
covering the employee only, or are offering coverage for the employee's
family that is too costly for the low-wage worker. The result is that very
large numbers of the working poor either lack coverage or have
inadequate coverage. For those who are covered, there are increasing
problems of information and access to health care, especially with the
rise of managed care. For those not covered, there are severe problems
in finding and getting free health care and at the same time, trying to
hold down a job. These considerations are well known, but, it need
hardly be said, reforming the health care system to cover the working
poor is exceedingly difficult and costly.35
Other major structural reforms are needed. The Unemployment
Insurance system is not designed to cover the low-wage, female labour
market, especially when mothers have to quit work because of family
crises. The result is that the great majority of welfare recipients who are
in and out of the labour market do not receive ui benefits; rather, they
treat welfare as u. 36 Many of the working poor and welfare recipients
have disabilities which make employment difficult to obtain but are
nevertheless not severe enough to qualify for ssi.
Finally, the issues involved in reforming the low-wage labour
market remind us once again of the special difficulties facing women.
The child care issue, as perhaps no other, illustrates the terrible
dilemmas now facing women. They have to work to maintain their
independence and the family's standard of living. At the same time, they
are forced into the low-wage, discriminatory labour market. Yet, neither
34
35

Supra note 17.

B. Wolfe, "Reform of Health Care for the Nonelderly Poor" in S.H. Danziger, G.D.
Sandefur & D.H. Weinberg, eds., Confronting Poverty: Prescriptionsfor Change (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994) 253.
36 The percentage of unemployed who receive ui has steadily declined to about a third. A
principle problem for the mother is that quitting for "good cause" usually means "work connected,"
not for "family reasons" (for example, a breakdown in child care because of shift work). Another
big problem is the lack of fit between temporary jobs and multiple jobs with the requirement of
being available for "suitable work": see Maranville, supra note 29.
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men nor the government recognize their special burdens as mothers. In
the United States, mothers are working more, longer hours, spending
less time with their children, and suffering more stress and more ill
health-and with growing poverty, there is more neglect and abuse.
Reforming the low-wage labour market, by increasing income from work
and subsidizing, at least in part, child care and health care, can partially
alleviate only some of the problems that women workers face. For this
reason, mothers of young children should have much more
support-paid family leave, for example-and not be required to work
on pain of losing benefits.
There are a number of objections to starting reform with the
low-wage labour market. Traditional welfare policy starts at the other
end-with long-term dependents, for two reasons: first, this group,
which is most in need, consumes a disproportionate share of welfare
costs; therefore, programs that move these people off of welfare and
towards independence will be the most cost effective; and second,
recipients at the other end-those more likely to benefit from an
improved labour market-will get jobs anyway.
There is considerable logic to this objection, but the problem is
the actual experience. In a word, we lack the technology and the
political will to do much for many of the long-term dependents. We
know that demonstration projects that are successful are also
complicated, subtle, expensive, and, most importantly, very difficult to
replicate. In the meantime, politicians lose patience with programs
focused on the long-term recipient, especially when results are uncertain
and costs begin to mount. Programs quickly become harsh and cheap,
and those who do not succeed are blamed. In addition, programs which
focus on the long-term dependent do not include men, which is a
mistake. Finally, these programs do not reduce poverty, which is the
major problem. Current welfare reform defines "self-sufficiency" as not
being dependent on welfare. This is extremely short-sighted.
Welfare rolls will go down, but not costs, probably not even
welfare costs, since long-termers, those who have more difficulties,
consume a disproportionate share of the welfare budget. However, the
main reason is that reforming the low-wage labour market is very costly.
In the area of child care, Barbara Bergmann estimates the costs as
follows: first, the subsidies cannot be restricted just to poor families, or
just to women coming off of welfare, nor to single parent families.
Rather, they have to be extended, on a sliding-scale basis to low- and
middle-income families. When these families are included, there are
altogether 19 million children under the age of five. Average
high-quality child care for preschoolers costs $4,800 per year; with
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sliding scales, this amounts to $36 billion annually. There are 29 million
older children who need care both before and after school and during
summers; at $3,400 each, with sliding scales, the total costs reach a total
of $39 billion. 3 7 Income support, then, involves major redistributions,
but the issue is poverty and inequality in America, not welfare.

37 B. Bergmann, "The Economic Support of Child-Raising: Curing Child Poverty in the
United States" (1994) 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 76 at 79.

